Abstract: The liberal international order has been under heavy strain in recent years. From Brexit to Trump's presidency, its tenacity is being put to the test. The resultant commotion should be a window of opportunity for China to materially revise the existing order or establish an alternative order under its leadership. However, the puzzle that is unfolding but not yet significantly examined is that China is seemingly not taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order to substantially revise the order or set up a new one. Premised on the metaphor of "following the flow," this paper argues that there is understandable rationale as to why
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By questioning the efficacy of globalization, extolling the break-up of the European Union (EU), disparaging U.S. military alliances in the AsiaPacific, and insinuating that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is outdated, Donald Trump has À À À within a year of his presidency À À À shaken the core foundations of the liberal international order that the United States has created and maintained since the end of World War II.
Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris Agreement suggest, on the surface, that the country might be shaking off some of its global responsibilities in favor of strict and narrowly defined American interests. Furthermore, Trump's demand that the United States share the global security burden with its allies reflects an inflection point in U.S. foreign policy and a challenge to the idea that a global power "assumes certain burdens" 2 and dispenses public goods and services, "such as security protection and support for open markets." 3 While the United States, the main architect of the liberal international order, is challenging and seemingly non-committal to upholding the same order, China as a non-Western rising power is increasingly casting itself as a guarantor and protector of some aspects of the liberal international order, in particular, free trade and globalization. Premised on the metaphor of 1 Brina Seidel and Laurence Chandy, "Donald Trump and the Future of Globalization," "following the flow," this paper explores the reasons why China is seemingly supporting the liberal international order instead of seizing the opportunity to materially revise the order or establish a China-led one.
The Myth of Trump's Global Retreat
Since the first day of his presidency, Donald Trump's "America First" doctrine has triggered concerns about whether the United States would withdraw from playing a leadership role in global governance. Notably, in his pursuit of the "America First" doctrine, President Trump vowed to prioritize U.S. interests over global cooperation. For example, in his maiden presidential address to the Congress, President Trump argued, "we've spent trillions overseas . . . America has spent approximately six trillion dollars in the Middle East, all this while our infrastructure at home is crumbling." 4 Combined with the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP and the Paris Agreement, it can be argued that during the Trump administration, the United States is withdrawing from its global governance leadership. President Trump seemed to confirm the withdrawal when he stated, "we will stop racing to topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we shouldn't be involved with . . . we don't want a depleted military because we're all over the place fighting in areas that we shouldn't be fighting in."
Part of President Trump's argument for that transition is that the United States, contrary to popular belief, has not benefited from the order it created. He contends that other countries, such as China, Japan, and NATO members, have reaped economic and security benefits at the expense of the United States, leading to a decline in its economic preeminence and global influence. The notion of a declining United States that Trump advances, albeit Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton's protestations, is not without scholarly backing. Noam Chomsky argues that the United States is a global power in decline.
7 Fareed Zakaria contends that we are in an era characterized by the "rise of the rest" and the dawn of the Pax Americana epoch.
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Oliver Stuenkel 9 goes as far as to suggest a post-Western order, in which non-Western global powers contribute to building a multipolar order or alternatively a multiplex world order as suggested by Amitav Acharya.
10
If indeed the world is transitioning from a unipolar to multipolar order, then President Trump's emphasis on "America First" is either a tactical withdrawal by a declining global power, or total abandonment of the U.S. global leadership role. Mr. He Yafei, former Vice-Minister of the State Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, described it as "an overall American strategic retrenchment that focuses more on domestic political and economic concerns with an ever more inward-looking approach to international affairs."
11 Nonetheless, even if the United States "withdraws" itself from world affairs and re-calibrates its foreign policy orientation, there is capabilities are a precursor to its global expansion and engagement, and they are essential to maintaining global dominance. If the "America First" doctrine aims to achieve that, then the tactical withdrawal by the United States from non-strategic international responsibilities may actually enable it to "husband its strength, preserve U.S. primacy far into the future, and safeguard liberty at home."
13
If the "America First" doctrine means isolationism, however, then the combination of a declining domestic economy and national power À À À plus a reputation of betraying various traditional international allies in not contributing positively to global governance À À À will be catastrophic to the U.S. global leadership. Hal Brands calls this version of "America First" the "Fortress America," because it represents hard-line economic nationalism, American sovereignty plus unilateralism at the expense of multilateralism, retraction of overseas commitments, self-regarding defence policy, and a pragmatic approach to alliances and promotion of democracy and human rights abroad.
14 This model of "America First" will rest "on a nearly zero- Is China a Revisionist Power?
As the global order transitions from a U.S. unipolarity to a multipolar global order, China is emerging as the main economic, diplomatic, and military competitor to the United States, although it "continues to lag far behind the U.S. militarily." 17 The U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) even forecasted that "over the long term, China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways." 18 Indeed, the diminishing leadership role of the United
States has provided a good window of opportunity for China to advance its own cause. Already, Chinese officials consider Beijing to be playing a prominent and decisive role in global affairs as the U.S. frontiers of dominance recede. China's role in and engagement with the liberal international order have been a subject of notable scholarly and policy analysis. For starters, China is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the current global order. 16 He, "Make Globalization Great Again." Benefiting from the liberal world order, China lacks the incentive to fully revise it or replace it with a new one.
It integrated into the "order with a speed and intensity rarely seen in the developing world . . . [opening] itself up to international investment, international trade, and transnational production to such a degree that China is essentially playing by our (Western) rules." 19 President Xi even described
China's global engagement as a strategic decision to benefit from being part of the liberal international order. For many international relations scholars from the West, Beijing's ardent advocacy of the liberal order sounds paradoxical. John Mearsheimer and David Lampton consider China to be a revisionist power seeking to challenge the existing international order so as to establish a parallel order, or, at the least, materially revise the existing one. 20 Martin Jacques succinctly argues in his aptly titled book, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, that as China uses "its new-found economic strength for wider political, cultural and military ends," it is "surely" becoming a hegemonic power. 21 He holds that China will ultimately seek to revise the current global order; therefore, it will be a spoiler in Schweller's terminology. 22 While Jacques agrees that China will be absorbed and integrated into the current American international order, he posits that "given that China promises to be so inordinately powerful and different, it is difficult to resist the idea that in time its rise will herald the birth of a new international order." 23 Therefore, according to Martin Jacques, even if it may not be a spoiler now, China will inevitably become one as its relative material capabilities continue to increase. Admittedly, China's relative economic power has been on an upward trajectory. In February 2017, it overtook the United States to become The puzzle that is still unfolding and not yet significantly examined is: if China is a revisionist power with "hegemonic" ambitions, why is it seemingly not taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order to materially revise the order or set up a new one of its own? In answering the question, some institutional liberals and realists contend that China is a deeply embedded beneficiary of the current international order. Joseph Nye adds that despite its growing economic power, China lacks the wherewithal to establish an alternative global order. 24 In concurrence, Citing a different reason, Thomas Christensen argues that for China, the cost of changing the system is too prodigious compared to the benefits of operating within its current confines, which makes China a de facto supporter of the current global order. As he puts it, "now that it is so deeply entrenched, why would China want to change international trade and financial institutions fundamentally, particularly when it has been doing so well within that system?"
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The challenge with the above two contrasting explanations of China's rise vis-a-vis the liberal international order is that they explain more about the West than they do about China. They focus on "constants rather than variables" 31 and put more emphasis on Euro-centric principles of power transition and balance of power than they do on China's "understandings" of the meaning and purpose of global power and influence. Rather than being preoccupied with explaining China's global power ambitions on the premise of realpolitik, and a balance of power policy based on threats of military force and direct confrontation in determining winners and losers in the struggle for global dominance, David Daokui Li cautions that we should 21st century will belong to China and also will belong to any countries, any nations or peoples who are willing to follow the flow.
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Although we may not entirely subscribe to his exclusive focus on Confucius traditions as main influencers of Chinese foreign policy, Li introduces an alternative explanation to China's paradoxical response and approach to current upheavals in the liberal international order. The phrase "follow the flow" well encapsulates that explanation. To "follow the flow" implies eschewing the fixity of grand strategies and following the natural evolution of events without forcing a particular outcome. Chinese President Xi Jinping once gave a hint of what "following the flow" would possibly look like in real-life foreign policy practice. As he said, "one must understand the trend of time, devise strategy and plan carefully." 33 In that sense, observing the trend of time precedes devising a strategy or even careful planning. This implies that a state does not push against prevailing global trends, behaviors and norms; rather, it observes the trend, and then makes pragmatic and flexible strategies that suit prevailing trends. The flexibility and fluidity of this approach does not imply the absence of Beijing's plan for its future in the international system. It simply suggests that China is opting for flexibility and maneuverability to achieve its global power ambitions "of`grand renaissance', aimed at a return to China's view of the regional status quo of pre-1840s colonial and subsequent Western domination. China has a fixed goal of national revival by a flexible and pragmatic approach.
When following the flow, China's foreign policy interests and objectives are the objects of fixity, yet the global environment in which they are practiced remains fluid and evolving. Following the flow, therefore, exemplifies the ability of China's fixed foreign policy objectives and interests to adapt and take advantage of the volatile flow of global developments, such as Trump's presidency, Brexit, and growing populism in the West. In turn, this ability to adapt and take advantage of the flow determines whether China will have any consequential effect on the liberal international order. Accordingly, the rise of China will be "a dynamic process, in which many changing material and ideational factors will shape policy choices of states as well as interactions among them." It can dominate À À À use its commanding material capabilities to prevail in the endless conflicts over distribution of gains. It can abandon À À À wash its hands off post-war disputes and return home. Or it can try to transform its favorable post-war power position into durable order that commands the allegiance of the other states within the order.
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Whereas Ikenberry envisioned the three choices in the context of a state emerging victorious from a major war, the current international order upheaval is not a result of war but internal convolutions within the current global order that have caused its architects to consider withdrawing or abandoning their global governance responsibilities.
In the turmoil that has followed Brexit, election of Donald Trump as U.S. President and the rise of ultranationalism in Europe, China seems to be positioning itself to replace the United States as a global leader. Niccol o Machiavelli speaks of the virtu to prepare for fortuna, or unexpected 36 He, "Explaining United States-China Relations." Yet, how exactly will China take over global power from the United States? Contrary to Ikenberry's explanation, the United States has not lost a major war; neither has China won a major war nor triumphed over the United States militarily. The implication is that for China, there is no victory to celebrate; hence, there is no decisive entry into global leadership. There is also no telling whether the United States will continue on the same withdrawal trajectory during the potentially erratic Trump's presidency or after. As there is no decisive transition of power, China seems to focus on following the flow whilst building its competence to "sense and take chances, to expand or even shape opportunities when 38 The paradox, however, is that instead of taking the opportunity of America's "withdrawal," and capitalizing on the current Western disenchantment with the liberal international order, China seems reluctant to build its own international order but prefers to protect the liberal international order and its globalization project.
China's Approach to Global Leadership
In acknowledgement of the U.S. supremacy in the balance of power rather than the balance of influence, China has consistently argued that it does not intend to take over global leadership from the United States. Chinese international relations scholars also assert À À À and correctly so À À À that China is still far from being able to assume a global leadership position. However, that does not mean China has no global leadership ambitions. As Ye Zicheng argues, "If China does not become a world power, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete. Only when it becomes a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been achieved." 43 On the surface, however, President Xi's speech at the 2017
World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos leaves us an impression of a China concerned about maintaining the current liberal international order, suggesting that China is not directly taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order. This might appear puzzling because amidst the U.S. and European nationalists' vitriol against globalization, China has confirmed its commitment to safeguarding globalization. The puzzling Chinese approach to global power distribution within the current global order has its roots in President Xi's "Chinese Dream" notion. Since coming to power in 2012, President Xi has been advocating for a new model of major-power relations (xinxing daguo guanxi). A constructive and non-antagonistic relationship with the United States is unarguably crucial to Beijing in realizing national rejuvenation and the Chinese Dream. Accordingly, when it comes to relations with the United States, President Xi favors an approach that encourages mutual respect, cooperation, a fair balance of global power distribution and recognition of China as an equal partner to the United States. President Xi's approach essentially reflects his pragmatism in international politics because he recognizes the importance of the existing liberal international order to China's economic modernization and advancement. In China's various international initiatives, one can see that it is in many ways trying to mimic the United States. For instance, the AIIB is modeled and structured along the same lines as the World Bank. Former World Bank officials also administer it, albeit with slight changes that enable the institution to serve China's global ambitions better. President Xi's strategy of minimizing direct conflict with the United States is to appear supportive to the liberal international order and dispel suspicions that the current upheavals are giving China an opportunity to try on "the mantle of global leadership . . . [A]ll countries enjoy the right to development. At the same time, they should view their own interests in a broader context and refrain from pursuing them at the expense of others . . .
[W]e must remain committed to developing global free trade and investment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation through opening-up and say no to protectionism. Pursuing protectionism is like locking oneself in a dark room. While wind and rain may be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air. No one will emerge as a winner in a trade war.
At the 24th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit held in Lima, Peru in November 2016, President Xi outlined China's strategy to promote free global trade. Compared with President Trump's argument that globalization was the root cause of America's decline or remarks by Marine Le Pen, a French far-right leader, that "our leaders chose globalization, which they wanted to be a happy thing. It turned out to be a horrible thing," 46 President Xi appears to be the one fighting for the liberal international order today. On the one hand, by appearing to support globalization and free trade, China is setting the parameters for its contest with the United States for legitimacy and global influence. This is because China has benefited immensely from globalization and free trade to the extent that it has become the biggest trading partner of most European, Asian and African countries. By supporting globalization, it portrays itself as concerned about sharing its economic wealth with the rest of the world, particularly the developing world. Beijing chooses to focus on economic matters such as free trade and globalization rather than geostrategic and military matters that the United States still dominates in. Unlike its military capabilities, China's relative economic capabilities are increasingly comparable to the United States. As put by Edward Luttwak, the focus on economic issues displaces the logic of military and geopolitical conflict, "which is adversarial, zero-sum, and paradoxical." 47 Accordingly, by following the trend of a global disconcert over Western populism, China's strategy is to reverse the overshadowing of the "economic realm by strategic priorities and strategic Vol. 20 No. 20 (1990), pp. 17-23. 48 Ibid., p. 20. well as offering alternatives to the TPP, is calculated to prove that China is a more reliable partner than the United States, feeding into an already existing concern among U.S. allies over the direction of the U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration.
On the other hand, China is maintaining its "peaceful development" narrative and scaling up its efforts in sharing ideas on how a fair and just global governance system can be established. By following the flow, China is expected to foster "contingent cooperation with the major powers while seeking to reassure nervous neighbors." 58 In doing that, Beijing is able to dispel the "China threat theory" while fostering a conducive environment for its economic and global influence growth. In that respect, while the United States withdraws from some multilateral arrangements, China is strengthening its multilateral engagement in institutions such as the BRICS (a mainly economic coalition among Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), APEC, and the Group of Twenty (G20), giving an impression that China is committed to multilateralism even if it may not be in its best interest. In other words, whilst the United States is demonstrating that it does not want to be constrained by multilateral rules in a rule-based global system, China is committing itself to constraining its growing relative power for the benefit of other countries, especially those in the Global South. According to He Yafei, by participating in these multilateral institutions, China is demonstrating global leadership through "proactive discussions about and negotiations on safeguarding global governance system while advocating needed changes to make the system better suited for the 57 Barry Naughton, "Xi Jinping's Economic Policy in the Run-Up to the 19th Party . . . we should clearly present our policies to the outside world, tell China's story in an acceptable way, speak out so that we are heard, and interpret the Chinese dream from the perspective of the aspiration of all people in all countries for a better life and regional prosperity, and let the sense of common destiny take root with our neighbors.
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In this sense, China appears not to be seeking a coercive order imposed by the powerful but a consensual order "undergirded by some mixture of rationalist calculations of material self-interest and convergent values, affinities, and identities." 61 Signs are already emerging. For instance, in February 2017, members of the African Elephant Coalition (AEC) urged the EU to emulate China in banning ivory products. The AEC Chairman Patrick Omondi said, "we need other countries with legal domestic markets to follow suit and are calling on the EU to take advantage of the momentum created by China and shut down their trade and ivory once and for all."
63 As then Ethiopian
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn told The Wall Street Journal, "China has become a model not only for Ethiopia but now even the new administration of the United States . . . They are focused on bringing back jobs and manufacturing to the U.S., which obviously means the Chinese drive to have manufacturing at home has become a model even for the U.S." 64 authoritarian political system makes it easier to continue its governing path and advance its international posture even if a new leader comes into office. What is less certain is the foreign policy trajectory in the United States. As noted previously, if President Trump successfully re-calibrates America's relative power and sustain its hegemonic influence, albeit in a multipolar environment, China may change its "reactive" approach, and there might be more confrontation between the United States and China. However, if President Trump fails in his "America First" doctrine, leading to the decline of both America's hard and soft power internationally, then China's approach of following the flow will prove even more effective.
